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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
 On the evening of the 6
th
 of April, 1994, the jet carrying Rwandan President 
Juvénal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down. 
Within hours the Rwandan Presidential Guard, parts of the military, and extremist Hutu 
militias had set up blockades and began rounding up and killing those in the Government 
– mostly ethnic Tutsis – who supported a UN backed peace process that had ended a 
three year civil war. The next morning the newly elevated head of state, Prime Minister 
Agathe Uwilingiyimana, was captured by the marauding military and militia forces. She 
was forced to watch her husband and children executed on the lawn of a United Nations 
Development Programme compound before being killed herself. The second-in-
command of the United States Embassy could do nothing but listen to the cheers of the 
assassins from a nearby compound.
1
 Ten Belgian Peacekeepers who had been sent to 
protect Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana were rounded up, executed in cold blood, and 
their bodies mutilated. Over the next three months nearly a million people were hacked to 
death with machetes, shot as they fled from machine guns, and entire families were 
slaughtered as they huddled together in what became the largest genocide since the 
Holocaust.
2
 The world did nothing but watch with bewildered dispassion. 
 The United States – having recently suffered nearly a hundred casualties while 
participating in a UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia – actively sought to prevent UN 
intervention. The White House failed to hold even a single staff meeting about the 
atrocities as a fifth of the Rwandan population was exterminated over the course of just 
                                               
1 PBS Frontline, “Ghosts of Rwanda” Interview with Joyce Leader 
2 The Atlantic, “Bystanders to Genocide” by Samantha Power 
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three months. In 1998, four years later, President Clinton stopped by the Rwandan capital 
of Kigali to apologize for the inaction of the international community during the 
genocide.
3
 He would later repent further, saying “we just blew it. I blew it. I just, I feel 
terrible about it.”4 
President Clinton has consistently referred to the failure to intervene in Rwanda as 
the worst foreign policy mistake of his Administration.
5
 However, this was not a failure 
of technical or military policy; no numbers were crunched incorrectly, no helicopters 
crashed, and no Americans lost their lives or even mistakenly took the lives of others. 
Nor was it a failure of the structure of government or lines of communication. Non-
intervention in Rwanda was a moral failing and President Clinton was ashamed at letting 
down the character of the United States of America. 
This character of nations and the social order that it creates is the subject of this 
thesis. Each and every nation has ideas of what constitutes legitimate and appropriate 
action in certain situations – its vision of the good. Since the genocide in Rwanda, the 
United States, NATO, “the West” in general, and many others have become more 
committed to preventing civilian massacres in what has become known as the 
“responsibility to protect.” However, China claims that state sovereignty cannot be 
trumped by any responsibility to protect in cases of mass atrocity.
6
 The “rise of China” is 
not to be feared because China is evil. It is not. What causes concern is the collision of 
competing definitions of justice and its effect on the international social order. Every 
nation frames political responses in terms of rights, responsibilities, and appropriateness. 
                                               
3 The Miller Center, “Remarks to the People of Rwanda (March 25th, 1998). 
4 The New Yorker, “The Wanderer”, by David Remnick. 
5 Ibid.  
6 New York Times, “China and Others Reject Pleas that U.N. Intervene in Civil Wars”, by Barbara Cossette 
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Each country believes itself to be in the right. These conflicting definitions of justice are 
at the heart of the central question of this thesis: what gives rise to different 
understandings of what is just and what role do these normative perceptions play in 
international politics? Subsequent chapters will explain the origin of these visions of the 
good and describe their impact on international politics. This thesis will reveal how 
material force and perceptions of legitimacy interact across domestic society and the 
international community to define international politics as a struggle for justice in pursuit 
of differing visions of the good. 
The concept of visions of the good is intricately linked with the definition of the 
state as a social actor. No matter the government type, the size of the country, or the 
predominant religions, all states operate on normative principles known as the state’s 
identity. Identity incorporates the values a state pursues using whatever resources it 
posses. However, even the seemingly most steadfast states do not decide on their guiding 
principles at the level of government. Each and every state is co-constitutional with both 
domestic society and the international community. That is to say, it is impossible to 
encapsulate an understanding of the state without reference to its domestic population, 
who operate as the agents of the state, and the structure of the international system found 
in the international community. Through the causal mechanisms of legitimacy and 
physical domination, the state is forged in the nexus between agent and structure. Unique 
from other formulations of the body politic is the revelation that states seek not power 
through war, but to shape the peace so that it conforms to their notion of justice and 
legitimacy – their vision of the good. 
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This thesis does not seek to identify grand transhistorical patterns, but merely 
aims to identify heretofore unknown linkages which guide international politics. 
Knowledge of these forces will not only enhance our capacity to explain past events and 
our ability to predict trends into the near future, but it will establish a framework for 
thinking and speaking about how the world should be ordered.
7
 
No explicit paradigm is adopted for this work, but international relations theorists 
will find concepts and terminologies from Neorealism, Neoliberalism, and 
Constructivism within these pages. Each paradigm has important revelations as to the 
fundamental workings of the world; it is important to recognize and make the most of 
these truths. Inspiration is also taken from the British School for its willingness to engage 
with the interplay between domination and society and from post-structuralism for its 
more nuanced, if incomplete, understanding of power. 
While centered on international relations theory, the motivations for and purposes 
of this argument run much deeper. A wider and troubling social trend towards 
individualism and materialism denies the very existence of many of the social 
phenomenon described within these pages. The very idea of morality and goodness is 
defined out of the public discourse, limiting the domain of discussion. This blindness 
prevents fundamental differences from being productively addressed 
The second chapter delves more deeply into the concept of visions of the good, 
clarifying key terms such as justice, legitimacy, and identity. The third chapter describes 
how the state is created by individuals in a process of reification based on common 
understandings of how the world should be. Chapter four shows how this domestic 
                                               
7 For example, this thesis is not concerned with the question of why states trade, but asks why states create 
the rules of trade that they do. This then allows for questions about which set of rules governing trade is 
best or most just. 
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construction of the state is tempered by the views of the international community and 
how the forces of legitimacy and physical domination jointly decide which vision of the 
good the state expresses. The process by which visions of the good change is detailed in 
the fifth chapter. The sixth and final chapter concludes with an analysis of why 
theoretically deep understandings of the social life are necessary for productive theory-
building and how this informs our ability to reason about how the world should be 
ordered. 
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Chapter Two: Justice 
 
“America was established not to create wealth but to realize a vision, to 
realize an ideal - to discover and maintain liberty among men.” 
– President Woodrow Wilson 
 
 Each and every social unit – people, communities, states, and the community of 
states – has an internally consistent understanding about the way things should be. These 
perceptions of appropriateness define the social order that these groups help to create. By 
no means will the set of appropriate behaviors envisaged by one group be at all the same 
as another’s understanding. We have already seen how China’s vision of an immutable 
sovereignty is different from, say, the United States’ more limited view of the right of 
sovereignty. Nor is there any guarantee that these views are consistent across time. 
Interactions with others and the very practice of life can change these perceptions, much 
as the failure to intervene in the Rwandan genocide later came to be recognized as an 
injustice. 
 This chapter aims to create a deeper understanding of these normative beliefs and 
to show that they are the main driver behind the creation of social order. Through the 
force of legitimacy, social actors construct their understandings of justice, which, taken 
together as a vision of the good, define the identity which drives the actor and influences 
international politics. 
 
 I. The Meaning of Justice 
 
 When political philosophers speak of justice, they often adopt some sort of 
universal ordering principle such as “the greatest good for the greatest number” in 
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utilitarianism or Locke’s ideas on natural rights. The principles that these decision rules 
result in is a conception of justice. Robert B. Talisse defines a conception of justice as 
 
 “the collection of principles by which society distributes rights, social 
goods, duties, and responsibilities. Every social group, insofar as it 
exhibits any stable scheme of cohesion and cooperation at all, will realize 
some conception of justice; that is, every assembly of persons which can 
properly be called a “social group” will exhibit implicit principles of 
organization which determine the roles, rules and responsibilities of the 
individuals of which it is compromised.”8 
 
The systematic organization and application of these principles is the job of theories of 
justice. Both the society’s conception and theory of justice is aimed at regulating certain 
social functions – excluding neither material interactions such as trade nor purely 
ideational functions such as positions of status. In John Rawls’ terms, justice is then “the 
way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and 
determine the division of advantages from social cooperation.”9  
 In terms of states, these “social institutions” are much more loose and informal 
than any national court system. Nonetheless, states do share a social structure. The widely 
held idea that rich countries should provide foreign aid is one example of this social 
order. This is encapsulated in a more strictly institutionalized form through the World 
                                               
8 On Rawls by Robert Talisse on page 19 
9 The Theory of Justice by John Rawls on page 6. The use of Rawls here is merely an example of one 
possible way in which the milieu of justice can be understood. This thesis does not intend to adopt any 
Rawlsian framework.  
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Bank and its efforts to encourage international development. Even the means by which 
the World Bank operates is a form of justice as the rules it sets influence who benefits. 
Other examples would include multilateral treaties such as the Basel Accords which 
regulate banking or the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Justice in 
the international arena, then, is concerned with the rules and expectations which govern 
the behavior of states, including, to adapt Rawls’ definition of justice, their rights, duties, 
and methods of fair interaction. 
 Ideas of international justice are not limited to states or their governments. In the 
end, it is individuals who conduct international business and suffer or prosper based on 
which set of rules are established. It is families who suffer when mothers and fathers are 
killed in a war to defend allies against unjust attack. It is communities who band together 
behind a common interest to lobby their government – or even other governments or 
international institutions – for the promotion and implementation of human rights. The 
international order effects everyone at every level of society and, thus, everyone has, at 
the very least, some form of intrinsic feelings about whether they are being treated 
properly by this system of justice 
 
 II. Perceptions of Legitimacy 
 
 At the most fundamental level, people’s judgments about what is fair is based on 
legitimacy: the perception of what ought to be. Actions which are unjust are illegitimate 
and ought not to be. Later chapters will go into more detail on the process by which 
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legitimacy is formed and functions in the world, but for now it is only necessary to 
recognize its existence and form.  
 Legitimacy is not just applied to outcomes; it is also a property that can be 
granted to social institutions. When courts issue decisions, these orders are respected and 
obeyed (in an ideal world at least) because the courts have been given authority by the 
people. Individuals recognize that the court itself should exist and that it should issue 
judgments along a certain form. Because the individual has granted that the court should 
be, the individual has ceded some of his or her ability to decide on what those judgments 
should be, exactly. The individual accepts these inconsistencies because the court is seen 
as possessing some intrinsic authority over such matters. In addition, the President has 
been granted the legitimate authority to pardon offenses. These cases indicate that, in 
practice, justice will not always be what a collection of individuals think on a single 
issue. Rather, the outcome will be influenced both by perceptions of justice and by 
intervening institutions. Both of these are functions of legitimacy. While it may seem 
contradictory than a legitimate authority could issue what appear to be illegitimate rulings 
yet maintain its legitimacy, this problem is simply the recognition that we operate in a 
complex world where no theory of justice can be applied perfectly. This indicates that it 
is primarily perceptions of legitimacy which drive the application of justice. 
 In the international system, this duality of legitimacy is present in the workings of 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). No other body is widely recognized as 
being able to authorize warfare, yet the UNSC has not always acted justly in its dictates – 
failure to intervene in Rwanda and other nations being such examples. States as well as 
institutions can have or lack legitimacy. During the Cold War the United States and the 
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Soviet Union were seen as the moral leaders of their respective blocks. They may not 
always act justly according to even the views of their allies, yet they still retained a huge 
stature. Individuals can also be objects which are granted legitimacy – think Pope John 
Paul II in 1979 Poland or Mohandas “Mahatma” Gandhi. Beyond institutions and 
individuals, however, even ideas can be seen as legitimate or not – even outside of the 
effect which they have. If one thinks that the norm against the use of nuclear weapons is a 
good thing, the very norm can be granted intrinsic legitimacy above and beyond any 
legitimacy derived from preventing possible unjust destruction. 
 
 III. A Vision of the Good 
 
 It is important to recognize that perceptions of justice are imperfectly applied and 
that legitimacy also matters. A vision of the good, then, is an actor’s set of perceptions 
concerning the structure of legitimacy. This takes into account both the theories of justice 
that are seen as proper in addition to which institutions are seen as having independent 
authority. The central claim that international politics is a struggle for justice must be 
tempered by the fact that this quest for justice is seen through the lens of legitimacy. Both 
the institutions and the theories of justice matter. 
 Each actor has its own vision of the good which may differ in subtle or substantial 
ways from others. The differences between different visions are arbitrated in the realm of 
politics, or, occasionally, through politics by other means.
10
 Differences lead to questions 
over how much to reply on the authority of certain institutions and over which principles 
to promote in international politics. The process by which these debates are settled at any 
                                               
10 “Politics by other means” is a popular Clausewitz quote which constitutes a partial definition of war. 
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one point in time are described over the course of the next two chapters, but the evidence 
for the existence of these disagreements is clear. The United States did not feel that it 
required the authorization of the United Nations to go to war in Iraq in 2003, yet other 
nations put greater legitimacy in the decision-making process of the UN and widely 
criticized the US for this failure.  
 Perceptions of legitimacy are what drives states’ construction of the international 
social order. By responding to perceived injustices and acting consistently with their own 
moral reasonings, state actions conform to the limitations of their normative assertions 
about what ought to be. Most of international politics is found in settling the differences 
between various visions of the good. Questions of appropriate economic policy come into 
play; worries are expressed about when conflict is permissible; and the merits of certain 
types of development aid are debated. 
 
 IV. Identity 
  
 These conflicting perceptions of justice come together, as described in later 
chapters, to form the social order. When a state disagrees with the present system of 
justice and institutions and has the capability to change them, it will do so. States seek to 
maximize the influence and expression of their vision of the good through the most 
efficient means available. Wherever order is a concern, the vision of the good a state 
adopts is that state’s identity. The state will rationally pursue the ends found within its 
identity. These ends could follow the logic of consequences (do whatever is necessary to 
achieve a just goal) or it could follow the logic of appropriateness (justice is not 
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independent from the means used to achieve it) depending on how the state understands 
its theory of justice. 
 State identity is defined by a vision of the good, which is a set of perceptions of 
legitimacy. Legitimacy is the belief that a principle of justice or a social institutions ought 
to be. Identity, therefore, is the set of normative claims or beliefs about the way things 
should be. State identity is not necessarily based on the ways things are now, but rather 
on one vision of what should be.  
 But when we say that a state has an identity which expresses its vision of the 
good, what exactly do we mean by the state? The next chapter will address the issue of 
specifying where the normative perceptions for state identity arise and the process for 
determining which vision of the good is expressed. 
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Chapter Three: 
Agency and the Domestic Construction of the State 
 
“L'état, c'est moi.” 
 – Louis XIV 
  
 In International Relations, state-level analysis has long received criticism for 
ignoring the importance of human agency in affecting the actions of the state in 
International Politics.
11
 This “micro” critique seeks an explanation as to how it is that 
nations have interests and make decisions, rather than presupposing an 
anthropomorphized state. By introducing a more precise understanding of what the state 
is – and where agency comes from – this chapter will show how states can be 
productively and legitimately viewed as actors endowed with interests in an international 
system. 
 This chapter is divided into five sections. The first will review how other authors 
have addressed the relationship between people and the state. The second will describe 
how the socially created individual is the source of agency, while the third section 
describes how these individuals creates imagined communities like the state. The fourth 
section will discuss the role and idea of legitimacy in limiting the state and the fifth will 
address limitations arising from physical domination. 
 
  
                                               
11 See, for example, Alastair Iain Johnston’s chapter entitled “The Social Effects of International 
Institutions on Domestic (Foreign Policy) Actors” (p149) in Locating the Proper Authorities: The 
Interaction of Domestic and International Institutions edited by Daniel W. Drezner (2003) where he says 
that sociological approaches allow or even demand that the unit of analysis be the individual or small 
group. This was also a major criticism of Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics in Wendt’s World 
by Steve Smith (2000). Many post-positivists in Constructivism reject the importance of having any sort of 
causal claims at all; see Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis by Milja Kurki 
(2008) on page 130. 
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 I. The Self 
 
 In order for states to have visions of the good, the state must be an actor endowed 
with normative principles. The state must literally be understood as an entity which is 
capable of having and acting upon beliefs about what ought to be. However, we 
traditionally attribute those characteristics to individuals alone. This section will 
demonstrate how agency is built up from the individual to the state. 
 If we are to begin with the individual as the source of all agency, as is 
traditionally assumed, then it becomes necessary to define what the individual is. A basic 
and agreed upon claim is the physical features of a human being. Everyone has a heart, 
blood, bones and muscle systems which permit physical interaction with the world. 
However, even basic forms of animals contain these exact same kinds of features. It is in 
the experience of consciousness, free will, and abstract reasoning that agency arises and 
humans become differentiated from other animals. It is in this mental sphere where the 
state, if it is to have agency, must arise.  
 Despite each individual combination of mind and body being physically 
separated, however, no individual would claim to be constituted of his or her own 
physical matter alone. Rather, the self arises in one’s social relations as a mother, a 
father, a hunter, a warrior, a teacher, a student, or even as an American. Even if one was 
stranded on a deserted island, one would define him or herself by the absence of others – 
as an outcast, a survivor, or one in need of assistance. These all things which give the self 
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reason to exist, a purpose or telos to pursue – the self is not prior to its ends.12 That is to 
say, each individual is constituted in part by his or her social relationships with others. In 
this view, the self is only in relation to others.
13
 Social relationships create meaning and 
seeking to fulfill these relationships is what makes us us. Agency originates from the self, 
which exists in social relations with others, rather than as “atomistic” individuals who 
only interact in the physical world. 
 
 II. Reification of Imagined Communities 
 
 In early hunter-gatherer and tribal societies, it is easy to see how groups of people 
who physically interacted on a daily basis defined themselves as part of this group and 
their social relations within it. However, modern groups consist of much larger numbers 
of people, none of whom have met all the others, yet who all define themselves as part of 
a whole. These “imagined” groups can best be understood as communities: constitutive 
relationships which help define a part of the self as the in-group. Even conceiving of 
oneself as part of this group leads individuals to internalize the “values, norms, and 
accepted patterns of behavior” if they were not already in place.14 In this sense, the 
communities that people form – from the family to the nation – help to create the person, 
just as the person helps to constitute the community. Not all participation in groups and 
communities has a large effect. If the individual does not internalize the norms and values 
of the community for whatever reason, then they remain unattached.  
                                               
12 A point made by Kymlicka against liberal Kantian individualism in Chapter 6 of Contemporary Political 
Philosophy (1990, p200). 
13 See Charles Taylor on page 111 in Liberal and Communitarians edited by Mulhall and Swift (1992). 
14 Personal Identity, National Identity, and International Relations by William Bloom, page 26. 
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 The seminal book on these larger groups is Benedict Anderson’s Imagined 
Communities. The most immediate example of an imagined community is that of the 
nation-state. Anderson defines the nation as a limited, sovereign, community.
15
 The 
nation is limited in that it sees itself as discontinuous with other nations – boundaries 
divide it from others. Sovereignty is understood as the authority over all internal affairs, 
while a community here means a deep, horizontal comradeship. Anderson arrives at this 
definition through analyzing the shared experience created by the rise of print media, 
which allowed people in disparate locations to share an experience and ideas without ever 
meeting or even purposefully communicating. 
 It is through these means that the state is created. Through common 
understandings and perceptions of the way justice should be created through both 
legitimate institutions and conceptions of justice, these imagined communities reify the 
state. Reification is the creation of an entity through shared beliefs. The term “state” is 
here referring to the general idea that the state is a set of institutions aimed at regulating 
the rules of society as the final arbiter of justice. Because this group of sovereign people 
believe that they should be and are a state, they act upon their shared perceptions, 
creating the state in the first place.
16
 Because people are co-constitutional with their 
social communities, agency is shared with the state as people operate with shared 
normative expectations.
17
 The state is not a visible, singular entity. It can, however, be 
detected in many ways: troop formations, border checks, national flags, political rallies, 
                                               
15 Page seven. 
16 It may also take a physical revolution to acquire the means to act as this state, but the idea that there 
should be a state is and must be prior to any material action to create it. 
17 It is the judge who issues court orders, police who enforce the shared ideas of law, and citizens who 
follow these laws either because they agree that they are good laws or they think that others will enforce 
them. None of these are the state, but simply evidence that there is a shared idea of the state. 
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and capitol buildings, to name a few. In other words, state agency is seen in the effects of 
the state. None of these are the state itself, but merely evidence of the existence of the 
state. 
  
 III. Legitimacy 
 
 However, this existence is predicated on the state having legitimacy in the eyes of 
those who reify it. Legitimacy is the belief that an entity ought to be. The state is granted 
the authority to pursue a prescribed ends, purpose, or telos. In this case of the state 
existing through reification, a removal of legitimacy would be the death of the state. 
Police wouldn’t enforce rules; court orders would have no effect. The presence of 
legitimacy helps to ensure law abiding behavior, whereas the absence of legitimacy 
leaves little social order. Indeed, the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia during the Arab 
Spring are consistent with the partial loss of the government’s legitimacy. 
 The bounds of legitimacy limit state activity. In Egypt, soldiers refused to enforce 
harsh sanctions on protesters, limiting how the Mubarak regime could respond. These 
actions were considered unjust and outside of the bounds of acceptability. It’s not just the 
material constrains of an unresponsive military that matter though. For the most part, 
leaders are aware of the social limitations of their actions. More generally, people in 
government come from the same communities that reify the state and so the bounds of 
legitimacy are not pushed against as both domestic society and the government have 
common perceptions of justice. 
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 However, even in democracies where leaders are publicly chosen, the pattern of 
legitimacy matters. Every individual is not created with the same ability to influence the 
society’s perception of justice. Certain people are endowed with positions of social 
prestige, such as priests or celebrities, which enable them to have an oversized impact on 
the bounds of legitimacy. Every state has a different social structure, so this is taken as an 
exogenous variable outside of the domain of this study. What matters is that a social 
consciousness which regulates perceptions of legitimacy exists and has an impact on the 
state and that legitimacy is not simply a function of physical power. 
 The literature on the topic of legitimacy has a wide scope and a pervasive 
tendency towards ill-defined concepts.
18
 Many case study analyses assume a flexible 
definition which allows them to place the blame on any state failures as a loss of 
legitimacy and explain the success of others as enforcing their legitimacy through the use 
of force. In effect, legitimacy is simply the handmaiden of power in the understanding of 
the state. This section will show the fallacy of this approach, examine other possibilities, 
and propose a more nuanced and productive theoretical understanding of legitimacy. 
 In Politics as a Vocation, Max Weber describes three types of legitimation of 
domination. These are mirrored by Anthony Giddens in Capitalism and Modern Social 
Theory and so will be addressed together here, with Giddens’ descriptions appearing first. 
(1) The first is “Traditional”: the sanctity of that which is old. This is called the appeal to 
“eternal yesterday” by Weber. Giddens divides this into gerontocracy where the source of 
                                               
18 As explained below, this is painfully obvious in the writings of Alexander Wendt who defines the state 
based on the usual definition of “a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.” However, he also defines the 
constitution of the state in such a way that the domestic population bust always and necessarily view the 
state and its actions as legitimate. The use of legitimacy in this definition of the state is superfluous, leaving 
the state as simply “the monopoly on the use of force” – an intellectually weak and prima facie dubious 
claim.  
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legitimacy is found in village elders, patriarchalsim where the source is the head of the 
house, and patrimonialism where the source is an administrative staff. Patrimonialism is 
often a lingering effect of (2) “Charismatic” Legitimacy where an almost superhuman 
and often revolutionary force validates certain actions. This is often transitory and based 
on this one person, so the establishment of an administration to carry on this legacy can 
take the form of patrimonialism. Weber identifies this as the “gift of grace” by those who 
are pursuing a calling to a cause and identifies it as the source of creativity in the 
evolution of rule. In The Sociology of Charismatic Authority Weber explains that this 
type is intermittently unstable due to its opposition to order and lack of initial 
bureaucratization. The third type of legitimacy is (3) “Legal.” These are impersonal 
norms consciously established through traditional or charismatic legitimacy and exist 
separately from offices and the holders of those duties. Weber is more specific and sees it 
as the trust in the competency of these rules. These three types form the basis for most 
understandings of legitimacy in contemporary philosophy and sociology.  
 Weber also discusses the function and origin of legitimacy on an individual level. 
He says that obedience is found through a combination of hope and fear and implies that 
these three aforementioned types of legitimacy are simply rationalizations of that 
domination through carrots and sticks. In Weber’s definition: “the probability that a 
command with a specific given content will be obeyed by a given group of persons”. 
While domination and legitimacy may both compel people to follow certain norms or 
pursue specified ends, they are very different effects. Under a system of domination an 
individual may follow the state’s policies out of a self interest of avoiding punishment or 
gaining material prosperity. He or she may do this without rationalizing their reason for 
- 21 - 
 
doing so. Indeed, if they did internalize this reasoning, there would be less of a need for 
the use of force. On the other hand, someone may pursue an action that goes against state 
because they believe that this action is good and legitimate – a charismatic leader who 
lacks a monopoly on power may still provide direction for appropriate means and ends to 
pursue. 
 When this understanding of legitimacy is applied to the definition of the state as 
seen in Weber’s Politics as a Vocation and adopted at least in part by most future state 
theorists including Wendt in Social Theory of International Politics, this definition of 
legitimacy can become circular. The state as a “monopoly on the legitimate use of force” 
implies that a monopoly on force is not sufficient to have a state – legitimacy is also 
required. But if legitimacy is simply the rationalization of domination, then every single 
monopoly of force should be able to create legitimacy. The term is therefore theoretically 
weak as it does not apply in all but the most unusual of circumstances in which those 
with a monopoly on the use of force are unable to appeal to tradition, charisma, or a legal 
order – an unlikely event given that some sort of appeal to these is necessary to gain 
power in the first place. It becomes unnecessary to use the term “legitimate” if force is 
sufficient for legitimacy. While it may indeed be the case that sufficient force can, over 
time, help to create legitimacy, it cannot be assumed to be the same thing.
19
 This 
causality problem is clearly evident in Wendt’s ignoration of legitimacy despite its 
inclusion in his definition of the state. 
 If states are to be anything other than societies of physical violence – both Wendt 
and I would argue that they are – then a redefinition of legitimacy is necessary. The first 
                                               
19 Material power is fungible. Not only can it be used to suppress protests with police and soldiers, but 
resources can be put towards reeducation initiatives or public spectacles glorifying the regime’s vision of 
the good as a  means of transforming material power into legitimacy. 
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step is to realize that it is a mistake to link legitimacy with power or force. Citizens of 
authoritarian states can be compelled to obey the laws through the use of force and the 
extension of incentives – in effect, influencing the material structure of domestic life – 
yet still not perceive the state as (1) the extension of the “eternal yesterday,” (2) the 
superhuman source of truth, or (3) as a source of competent laws. Many within the 
administration may see a despot or authoritarian regime in this light, but society at large – 
those governed under the monopoly of force – may not perceive the state as legitimate 
but simply as an existing structure that must be worked around. 
 This shows that legitimacy and domination are not necessarily linked. Domination 
–defined as the use or threat of use of overwhelming organized violence – is a material 
effect while legitimacy is an ideational perception. While these perceptions may originate 
from appeals to tradition, charisma, and legal order, they do not necessarily conform to 
material incentives. To ignore this dichotomy is to ignore an important effect in 
determining state actions. 
 In Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach, Jens Steffek 
recognizes this division and critiques current literature which assumes that legitimacy 
arises from the form of governance – usually democratic structures. Instead, he shows 
that it forms through communicative discourse based not on power or agency, but on 
goals, the scope, and procedures of the object or norm being established. In other words, 
legitimacy arises from common perceptions of justice. In the case of the state described at 
the beginning of this section, these common perceptions of justice are needed for the state 
to be reified as a legitimate entity.   
 
- 23 - 
 
 
 IV. Physical Domination 
 
 There is no requirement that a government have legitimacy in the eyes of the 
people. Rule by force can create compliance even in the absence of goodwill. By 
separating legitimacy from force, a more nuanced view of what the state is can be 
constructed.  
 Physical force can be used to make others, against their will, comply with a set 
definition of justice. Dictatorships are the classic example of domination without 
legitimacy. A small group of people can rule over a much larger population through 
maintaining a monopoly on the use of violence. So long as a ruler can call upon sufficient 
police forces, perceptions of legitimacy from the general population do not matter. Justice 
becomes understood simply as what the ruling coalition believes. Oftentimes, however, 
the cost of maintaining an illegitimate government is too high to sustain for forever. The 
dictator has two choices: govern more in line with what the public believes the state 
should do and thereby gain some legitimacy, or change what the people believe the state 
should do to align more with what the dictator believes. 
 Over time, a government with an absolute monopoly on the use of force can use 
these resources to educate or socialize a new generation of citizens to accept a different 
system of justice. Public holidays, government run newspapers, and other social mediums 
can be utilized to create a new shared experience that leads to greater public buy-in to the 
state and allows for lower expenditures on the maintenance of force. This can be seen in 
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North Korea where state run news services organize elaborate public displays of affection 
for the government. 
 If the state lacks legitimacy and loses its grasp on force, then social organization 
ceases to exist. Society will reorganize itself into the lowest common denominator of 
force and legitimacy. This can be seen in the recent history of Somalia where the collapse 
of state legitimacy and physical domination led to the proliferation of warlords (who rule 
largely by force) and the creation of Somaliland which declared its desire for 
independence from Somalia. Somaliland had undergone a different experience of history 
from the rest of Somaliland as a British colony which had only recently united with 
greater Somaliland – in 1960, about 31 years prior to the failure of the Somali state. This 
different experience likely resulted in a stronger regional identity which allowed for the 
creation of a smaller state when Somalia collapsed. Disorder cannot long last as people in 
the state of nature will soon find some means of social cooperation or be dominated by 
another’s system of order.20 
 If the state does have legitimacy, however, then no amount of force over the 
domestic population is needed. By and large, citizens of the United States do not need a 
constant police presence to act in accordance with the laws and system of justice because 
they believe that these things are just and ought to be anyway. Legitimacy is not 
guaranteed nor limited to democracies. China also has legitimacy stemming from its 
domestic population. The state will continue to exist regardless of whether the People’s 
Liberation Army has the physical ability to defeat any mass protest as the people believe 
that what the government does is just. The commonly recognized rise of Chinese 
                                               
20 That is to say, Hobbes’ Leviathan will be created de nova (a new legitimate order) or imposed from an 
outside force for its own interest (domination).  
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nationalism is evidence of the fact of this popular belief that the Communist Party ought 
to exist. 
 These combinations of legitimacy and physical domination can be expressed in a 
2x2 matrix. The system of justice that is expressed by the state can be deduced from the 
combination of the presence of legitimacy and physical domination. These are not clear 
cut categories and legitimacy is not all or nothing, as has been shown, but this is a useful 
mechanism for thinking about what goes into creating the state. 
 
 
   Table 1 
 Beginning in the top right, police states have a large degree of physical 
domination but lack domestic legitimacy. In the most extreme cases, the people would 
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have no influence whatsoever on the vision of the good that the state expresses. The only 
input would come from those who control the strings of the means to physical power. 
However, when moving along the x-axis closer toward the center, the rise in legitimacy 
means that the state would not need to devote as many resources to keeping the 
population in line. Moving down along the y-axis, the loss in the ability to repress or buy 
off the population results in some degree of necessary capitulation to the will of the 
people. The ruling regime no longer has the physical power to force compliance with 
their own vision of the good and therefore must compromise in order to gain a larger 
degree of domestic legitimacy and cooperation.  
 The bottom right quadrant indicates the absence of any vision of the good. Failed 
states are unable to express their identity because they have dissolved into the lowest 
common denominator – the only place where physical power and legitimacy do exist in 
sufficient quantity to sustain order. This collapse was seen in the failed Somali state that 
resulted in the fracture of the domestic community into numerous semi-autonomous 
states and rule by warlords in many other areas.  
 States in the left hand column – regardless of their ability to dominate the 
population – have sufficient legitimacy to exist independent of force. Sufficient numbers 
of people have sufficient agreement with the state’s vision of the good to think that the 
state should exist. If the domestic population agrees that the law of the land is just and 
want to follow said law, then no extreme measures of enforcement are necessary. The 
people’s vision of the good is being expressed. The key difference between the bottom 
left and top left quadrants is that, should the people’s perceptions of justice change from 
those of the regime, those formerly legitimate states with large police forces will continue 
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to reflect the character of the regime rather than the people’s new perceptions, while 
states with insufficient police forces must change or be changed in a process which could 
plunge the country into the realm of a failed state. 
 This chapter has shown that, as social creatures, human agency becomes 
embedded in the community when there are common conceptions of the good. The state 
is one form of community where the authority for justice is placed. The expression of 
these values depends upon the combination of legitimacy and physical domination found 
within each state. However, external forces can also shape the value expression of the 
state. 
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Chapter Four: 
Structure and the International Construction of the State 
 
Without an enemy, there can be no war.  
– Tagline to Joyeux Noël (2005) 
 
 When a swimmer enters a pool, he or she has nearly complete freedom of 
movement; doing laps, diving down and touching the bottom, or tossing a ball. If that 
same swimmer is placed into a river with raging rapids, the ability of that swimmer to 
decide his or her own destiny is diminished. The environment becomes more important 
than any choices the swimmer makes, rendering him or her as a patient in need of rescue 
rather than as a self-sufficient swimmer. 
 Understanding the environment and the constraints that states act within is vital 
for understanding the state itself. Just as legitimacy and physical domination played a role 
in the domestic construction of the state, these same two ideational and material forces 
impact the state from above. International society shapes states through determining and 
enforcing appropriate behavior in international politics.  
 
 I. International Society to International Community 
 
 Throughout history, civilizations have existed in a state of constant 
communication. Trade made the ancient Phoenicians and enabled colonies across the 
Mediterranean basin. The Greeks exported their ideas through great cultural displays and 
the conquests of Alexander and the Bactrians. Rome imported large quantities of eastern 
goods along the Silk Road, facilitating international communication and cultural 
exchanges. Diverse Hindu traditions on the Indian subcontinent were shared from one 
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kingdom to another. Islam spread across the vast Sahara Desert on the back of the salt 
and gold trade. The Crusades resulted in various treaties and agreements concerning the 
status of and access to Jerusalem. Germanic princes debated the role of the Holy Roman 
Empire and religion in their kingdoms. The British Empire established democratic 
conventions on every continent.  
 These interactions did more than simply generate material wealth or impose one 
culture on another. Indeed, oftentimes the causation went in reverse: the national food of 
Britain is popularly considered chicken tikka masala – originating from India. The spread 
of traditions and the creation of customs of appropriate behavior between states were 
constantly and everywhere reexamined, renegotiated, and changed. Medieval notions of 
chivalry dictated the behavior of kings in war. The Pope was granted the authority to 
divide the New World between Spain and Portugal. These norms of proper etiquette were 
the building blocks of international society. However, the universality of these ideas was 
hindered by the physical limits on the application of force and the expense of 
communication. 
 Globalization has changed that. From the telegraph to phones, satellites, and fiber-
optics, communication is now instant and the cost: negligent. Ships larger than 
skyscrapers move through canals which cut between continents, enabling massive 
amounts of universal trade. The ability to project force has also expanded. At the dawn of 
the first millennia it would have been unimaginable for the two great powers – the 
Roman Empire and Han China – to even wage a proxy war, much less threaten one 
another’s very existence. The adoption of gunpowder based weapons, advances in 
nautical travel, and the transportation innovations of the Industrial Revolution greatly 
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increased the destructive power of armies. Since the advent of bombers, nuclear weapons, 
and inter-continental ballistic weapons, the potential for destruction has become 
universal. 
 No longer is the creation of norms of behavior relegated to a few states in a 
constrained geographic area. Communication, trade, and the forces of destruction have 
become ubiquitous and inescapable. Whereas two nations may not have had the need or 
ability to communicate in the past, it now takes substantial effort to eliminate any 
interaction. This exponential increase in interaction between states has led to the 
development of certain accepted patterns of behavior that covers all states, not just a few. 
Globalization has led international politics from operating in a common International 
System to operating within an International Community where there are certain shared 
values and norms – just like in domestic communities. Likewise, the International 
Community uses the same two mechanisms to define the state: legitimacy and physical 
domination. As such, the extent to which the International Community participates in the 
creation and constitution of the state is purely a modern phenomenon.
21
 The extent to 
which other nations are involved in the affairs of individual states has never been greater. 
The involvement by the international community in defining the state is not a necessary 
condition, however. States existed well before globalization led to greater interactions 
                                               
21 Regional involvement in defining the state has always existed. The Roman Empire helped to establish 
and influence the Kingdom of Armenia, among many others, as a buffer state from eastern enemies. The 
spheres of influence utilized by the Concert of Europe would also constitute a form of constructing the 
state. What differs now is the extent to which all nations are involved and the ability to communicate and 
extend force across great distances – well beyond immediate borders or particular outposts. There is a 
limitation to this model, however. Threats of nuclear war, for example, cannot force a state into compliance 
on trade policy. The sheer lack of proportionality in such a threat would be taken as a joke, rendering it 
ineffective. With ICBMs out of the picture, state’s ability to apply force universally decreases. Marines 
storming a well defended state does not have the same ability to compel compliance and is much harder to 
implement due to the still large expense of transporting massive armies (the stopping power of water). 
While the past six decades have certainly resulted in a more globalized world and enabled the 
transformation of international society into an international community, this structure is not completely 
salient at all times and places. 
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between states. However, this late entry into the process of defining the state makes the 
international community and its effects no less real. Just as individuals can join new 
communities which then come to influence them, the states system has evolved to such 
an extent that this international community has a large influence in the everyday life of 
the state. Unlike people, however, it is not always possible for the state to simply move 
away (physically, ideologically, or with regards to the level of interaction) from a 
community it does not wish to join. 
   
 II. Legitimacy 
 
 Legitimacy arising from the international community is what makes a state 
possible. Legitimacy, we will remember, is the notion that an entity ought to be. 
Therefore, a state’s recognition as legitimate by the international community is the belief 
that the said state is, ought, and has a right to function as a state. These rights are 
understood as the concept of sovereignty: to be the highest power with the ability to make 
and enforce laws over its inviolable territories. 
 This definition comes with many caveats. One of the largest debates today is over 
the definition of legitimacy: China takes a very strict interpretation whereas many 
Western nations hold that sovereignty only applies when a state cares for its people. This 
is the exception that allows NATO to intervene in Kosovo and feel morally justified 
while at the same time other states feel just as just in declaring these actions wrong. This 
debate over what extent the “responsibility to protect” supersedes the right of sovereignty 
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has been reinvigorated by the Arab Spring and the revolution and partial intervention in 
Libya. 
 This political discourse over the definition of a state and its sovereignty has a 
tangible impact on what the state is. Just as the beliefs of the people are important in 
defining the state, the opinions of the international community also matter. Perhaps it is 
best to start with a less contentious example than Kosovo. Everyone agrees that Brazil is 
a sovereign state. In recognizing this authority, the international community (i.e. each and 
every other state) agrees to treat Brazil following certain accepted patterns. Brazil is 
authorized to purchase land for an embassy in other countries, its diplomats are extended 
immunity from prosecution, its home territory is not to be encroached upon, its merchant 
vessels are to be respected upon the high seas, fishermen from other states will not enter 
Brazil’s exclusive economic zone in the ocean, and other states will respect their treaties 
with Brazil – to name just a few customs, rights, and responsibilities of a recognized 
state. However, these characteristics are not immutable. The exclusive economic zone of 
a state did not exist until the international community decided that it existed at the third 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982. And even this limited the role 
of sovereignty in this area to fit the legal regime established by the convention. It does 
not matter what each state individually feels is just, but rather, the collective defines the 
extent of the state. If Brazil was to lose recognition – even if nothing material was to 
change – then it would lose the right to the economic resources of these waters. No state 
would come to its aid, especially through official channels of resolution. There would be 
no normative protections guarding Brazil; that is, other states would not see it as wrong to 
- 33 - 
 
take advantage of Brazil’s territorial waters or any other aspect of the state. Therefore, it 
is in Brazil’s material interest to maintain its recognition as a state. 
 It is also in Brazil’s social interest to maintain this recognition. Brazil, like every 
state, sees itself as pursuing the justice that its domestic constituency desires. External 
validation through recognition as a legitimate state can seem appealing insofar as Brazil 
sees the international community as setting a desirable standard, regardless of any 
economic or material advantages. Conversely, if Brazil sees the international community 
as inherently unjust, there will be no force beyond material calculation that would make it 
comply. This attraction to the ideals of the international community will be dealt with 
more thoroughly in the chapter on change. For now, the main points are understanding 
that the ontological category of “state” is by no means clear or consistent and that there 
are incentives to comply with the definition of a state imposed by the normative structure 
of the international community. 
 
 III. Physical Domination 
 
 For some states, the loss of legitimacy could spell death. Just as the presence of 
domestic legitimacy reduces the costs of maintaining order as the people want what the 
government wants, the presence of international legitimacy comes with certain 
guarantees which lower the cost of defense. Without this guarantee, the cost of 
maintaining security becomes impossible. This is evident recently in Libya, where the 
collapse of the Gaddafi regime was aided by the international community. The agreement 
to revoke the full recognition of sovereignty by the UN and the UN Security created a 
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space in which it was permissible for other states to take certain steps to prevent 
continued atrocities. Gaddafi did not have the material power to resist in the face of a loss 
of legitimacy, with a very clear impact on the existence of Gaddafi’s Libya.  
 In other states, the loss of legitimacy would be less consequential. While Somalia 
is largely considered a failed state with an ineffective transitional council, there are two 
regions which have organized themselves into self-governing units: Somaliland and 
Puntland. Neither receives de jure recognition of legitimacy from the international 
community. Nevertheless, these entities have not suffered the same fate of Gaddafi’s 
Libya despite even more meager resources. This lack of resources may be exactly what 
has prevented their collapse. There is no incentive to violate the de facto sovereignty 
because there is no benefit; they are simply ignored. Somaliland and Puntland exist 
outside of the states system, maintained only by domestic legitimacy and physical force. 
 On the opposite end of the spectrum there are states such as the United States 
which exist with sufficient physical power to deter any aggression regardless of 
legitimacy. However, working completely outside of the international community would 
be an unwise decision for all but the most absolute of hegemons. While it would be 
unreasonable to think that the US would be destroyed if it lost legitimacy, this does not 
mean that the US can completely ignore the conception of appropriate behavior for states. 
Indeed, US policies are actively shaped by this shared perception – particularly with the 
Arab Spring debate surrounding the responsibility to protect doctrine of defining state 
sovereignty. Were the US to do what it wanted without regard to this common notion of 
appropriateness and become seen by the international community as illegitimate, all the 
benefits of global communication and trade would begin to fade away as the US could 
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not physically force every country to comply with the US vision of the world if most 
other states were not in favor. 
 However, the US is able to force change in weak countries which deviate from a 
common norm. In 1954 the United States participated in a coup d'état against the 
Guatemalan President, Jacobo Árbenz. The CIA felt that Guatemala’s policies were not 
respecting private property in a legitimate way and had to be stopped to preserve 
capitalism.
22
 This external action led to a change in the internal balance of power in 
Guatemala which led a new regime - a government with understandings of appropriate 
behavior more in line with the US. If Guatemala had been a small state which complied 
with the international orthodoxy, then no international action would have occurred. 
 These different combinations of force and legitimacy can be represented on a two 
by two matrix.  
                                               
22 The system of distribution of economic resources in a fundamental topic in moral reasoning. Find 
citation. 
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   Table 2 
 States which are not recognized by the international community, yet which have 
sufficient deterrent force to stave off forced compliance, occupy the top right quadrant of 
this table. These rogue states are outside of the international community and are able to 
exist independently of the states structure. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is 
a longstanding example of such a state. It only partially participate in the international 
system, yet its geopolitical position has permitted it to survive long enough to develop a 
large military despite international condemnation.  
 If North Korea lost this deterrent ability, it would descend into disorder (bottom 
right). The vulnerability that material weakness would create would allow for external 
pressures to influence the state. If the international community was not able to bring the 
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state back into compliance with the common vision of the good, then some sort of 
intervention, in proportion to how illegitimate the state has become, is likely. An extreme 
case of this is Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait 1990. This unwilling annexation of a previously 
sovereign Kuwait was seen as unjust by the international community. International 
diplomacy was unable to bring Iraq back into the fold of international legitimacy, 
resulting in a counter-war and temporary disorder as the Kuwaiti government was 
reestablished and the rule of law restored. 
 The bottom and top left quadrants are separated only by the amount of force that 
the state is able to project. Great Powers have a much larger role in enforcing the 
international order through the use of force than the smaller states which lack sufficient 
physical power. These are the two types of states that make up the “usual” international 
order. 
 
 IV. Agent and Structure 
 
 These past two chapters have established the importance of both combinations of 
legitimacy & domination and agent & structure in defining the state. Legitimacy, driven 
by normative beliefs of what ought to be, can create or remove significant physical costs 
for action at the level or domestic society or the international community. These forces 
operate behind the scenes to create the reality that exists at any given moment. 
Understanding the structures and patterns of legitimacy can enable predictions about how 
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the world will change given certain exogenous shocks
23
. By way of summary, two 
general conclusions are also possible. 
 The vision of the good which is ultimately adopted is based on perceptions of 
legitimacy and the physical force that backs it up. This applies to both domestic society 
and the international community. The presence of legitimacy is the deciding factor in 
how expensive or hard a change in justice would be – destroying legitimacy with force is 
a costly affair. A two by two matrix of the different types of legitimacy – both 
domestically and internationally – is provided below. 
  
   Table 3 
                                               
23 i.e. Given a state with domestic legitimacy but an international community that it disagrees with, the state 
must either adopt the international standard and risk losing domestic support or oppose the international 
community and risk being alienated. The outcome will be decided by a rational decision between the costs 
of each. 
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 The top left quadrant is defined by the presence of both domestic and 
international legitimacy. These states tend to be fairly stable and typifies the international 
order. They are not prone to destruction from domestic revolt and the give no reason for 
international interference.  
 Moving to the right, the absence of international legitimacy despite the presence 
of domestic legitimacy will lead to a state seeking to change the international community 
or the international community seeking to change the state. These states, such as North 
Korea, perceive the existing international order as unjust while the international 
community views the state’s conduct as unjust. Recurrent crises are the result. 
 In the bottom right, the presence of international legitimacy and absence of 
domestic legitimacy is a fairly rare occurrence as dictators will usually be able to 
reeducate their populations over a sufficient amount of time and given sufficient degree 
of domination over the populace. However, these states rely on the international 
community to be maintained. The state would not have sufficient levels of available 
resources to push back against outside influence, as their concentration must be on 
ensuring the cooperation of the domestic population. Lacking sufficient resources to 
counter outside influence, these states are at the mercy of other states who hold material 
power over them.
24
 
 The final quadrant signifies the absence of both international and domestic 
legitimacy. This leaves a population in a state of chaos where all that matters is material 
power. As a result, these areas are often ruled by warlords or with intermediary 
                                               
24 This thesis assumes a singular international community as this is closest to what constitutes the current 
international system. In some instances, such as during the Cold War, there were multiple such 
communities. Puppet states would be at the mercy of whichever “sphere of influence” most dominated the 
area. 
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organizations which function as states but are not recognized internationally. The 
unfortunate fate which has befallen Somalia is a clear example of what happens when the 
social and material bonds that constitute a state have completely fallen away. 
 The state and its expression of its vision of the good is determined partly by 
domestic society and partially by the influence of the international community, working 
through the interaction of the forces of legitimacy and physical domination. Each state 
has a different vision of the good and international politics is the process of resolving 
these inconsistencies. The system of justice which is ultimately expressed in the 
international social order depends on states agreeing on legitimacy and physical power 
compliance with the views of the powerful. International politics is a struggle for justice 
as defined by each state’s vision of the good. 
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Chapter Five: Mediums for Change 
 
“Power is of two kinds. One is obtained by the fear of punishment and the 
other by acts of love. Power based on love is a thousand times more 
effective and permanent then the one derived from fear of punishment.” 
– Mohandas “Mahatma” Gandhi 
 
 Chapters two and three described how domestic society and the international 
community endow the state with a certain set of normative perceptions of justice known 
as visions of the good. These provide direction or purpose for the state when it makes 
calculations about what should be in the world. In trying to achieve these goals, the state 
will act in the most efficient manner that it knows how while operating within the 
limitations provided by the structure of legitimacy and physical domination in which it 
finds itself. In the everyday process of being, however, the communities which constitute 
a state may very well undergo a process of evolution in their understandings of justice. 
Certain situations may challenge them to rethink their usual responses or new ideologies 
may be developed. Predicting this kind of change is difficult, but we can understand 
relative changes between groups as being based on the social relationships which they 
construct. In addition, less influential groups may also undergo a form of identity change 
which causes them to seek to express their views more forcefully, upsetting the previous 
balance. One of the methods for change in international politics, then, is change in 
identity. 
 Because of the application of physical domination, however, the expressed 
identity of a state can be much different than the unexpressed or latent state identity 
inherent in any suppressed groups. This latent identity can be present at either the 
domestic or international levels and can quickly become relevant should the balance of 
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physical force shift and allow for a different group to gain control of the state. Material 
changes must also be recognizes as important mediums to change. 
 This chapter is divided into two parts. The first shows the means by which 
identity shifts over time and the second examines the impact of material changes on 
which vision of the good is expressed. 
 
 I. Change in Identity 
 
The way in which identity changes is rarely straightforward, but it can be 
examined through the effect on legitimacy. In Soft Power: The Means to Success in 
World Politics, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. lays out his description of soft power. In contrast to 
hard power, Nye defines soft power as cooption rather than coercion: “soft power rests on 
the ability to shape the preferences of others”25. The concept of soft power relies upon a 
dynamic understanding of interests; soft power only applies over time as one country 
causes a transformation of the perception of interest in another country in order to bring 
them into better alignment with the interests of the first. “Soft power rests on the ability 
to shape the preferences of others”26. 
This power originates “with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, 
culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having 
moral authority”.27 As part of this, a “country [which] suffers economic and military 
decline is likely to lose not only its hard-power resources but also some of its 
                                               
25 Page 5 
26 Page 5 
27 Page 6 
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attractiveness”.28 Assets fall into three categories: culture (“in places where it is attractive 
to others”), political values (“[when they are lived] up to at home and abroad”), and 
foreign policy (“when [the policies] are seen as legitimate and having moral authority”).29 
Culture creates attraction through reinforcing values and policies that others also value, 
and this appreciation is spread to other values that may not be completely shared. This 
happens through Hollywood films, commerce, and personal contact via tourism and study 
exchange programs. Political values are the second category as the government’s stance 
on values and policies also matters. However, inconsistencies between what a 
government says and does can harm it, just as racial segregation in the 1950s harmed 
American influence in Africa. The third category is foreign policy. The Iraq War of 2003 
was very unpopular internationally, leading the government to squander soft power that 
had been earned by society. The policies that governments promote internationally 
substantially affect others’ views of the nation.  
Nye goes on to specify that the context of soft power matters too: debaucherous 
Hollywood films may be attractive to South American or Chinese consumers, but would 
be seen as a negative in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan. Indeed, the government does not 
control soft power; a large portion comes from society at large as it creates a “general 
influence rather than producing an easily observable specific action”.30 
Joseph Nye’s conception of soft power is based upon the same social forces that 
help to construct the state. However, Nye has a much-too-narrow and ill-defined view of 
these forces. He fails to recognize the full importance and potency of legitimacy. The 
phenomenon which soft power describes is that of how nations’ views on what is 
                                               
28 Page 9 
29 Page 11 
30 Page 16 
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appropriate action change over time through the influence of other nation-states. That is 
to say that the concept of soft power takes advantage of the same underlying properties 
that the concept of visions of the good seeks to explain. However, soft power muddles 
this task by having insufficient theorizing on the role of legitimacy in dictating these 
views of appropriate action. Nye concentrates simply on power – the means to induce 
change – rather than identifying the sources and mechanisms behind states’ perceptions 
of interest. 
Nye’s account of the origin and sources of soft power is the most problematic part 
of his theory. Culture, political values, and foreign policies are the three mechanisms 
through which soft power is transmitted. What these three general categories all have in 
common is their relationship with legitimacy. Culture as expressed in terms of popular 
culture through films, business interactions, and exchange programs is a means to sharing 
values about what is good, appropriate, and constitutes legitimate action. Films portray 
life as it exists in a country, with all of its types of interaction – from business, to 
government, and even love. Business interactions express preconceived notions about the 
proper way contract disputes are settled. Exchange programs do all of this through 
immersion in the actual societies in question, rather than through representations therein. 
Culture is the expression of visions of the good. The same is true of political values, 
almost necessarily so. If the United States believes that human rights are universal, it 
would see any violation of human rights as inappropriate actions. For foreign policy, Nye 
says that the policies must have legitimacy and be seen as having moral authority. Even 
lacking a description of what legitimacy means in this instance, it is clear that Nye sees 
soft power as arising from agreement with the appropriateness of foreign policies. If the 
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origin of soft power is in legitimacy, then the Weberian framework of visions of the good 
may be applied more broadly.  
Second, Nye fails is in locating the proper actors that control legitimacy and in 
specifying the various possibilities that different structural arrangements can take. He has 
paved the way for the acceptance of soft power as a phenomenon, but has failed to 
capitalize on the power of its theoretical implications. Nye’s account of cultural 
interaction looks at the level of domestic society. He has individuals studying abroad, 
conducting business deals, and creating movies. Political values would seem to imply 
forms of government that the people accept from the state level, and foreign policy falls 
into the realm of the state. However, Nye has no explicit mention of levels of agency 
other than to say that both people and the state are important. From the actor-structure 
duality described in previous chapters which creates the state, only international society 
has not been mentioned. Can international society have soft power? Through bodies like 
the United Nations – but also through more informal and uninstitutionalized networks – 
what is seen as the legitimate will of the international community may be expressed. 
Instead of creating an attraction to a specific country, the international community is 
capable of sustaining and expressing legitimacy. Indeed, this is the very phenomenon by 
which the international community helps to form states in the first place! 
As soft power is a function of legitimacy, it may better be understood as arising 
from the same three Weberian sources that have been used throughout this thisis: 
tradition, charisma, and functional legitimacy. Rather than being a general influence, this 
approach will allow an examination of context specific issue areas, rather than reducing 
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the phenomenon of legitimacy to a “general influence”31. Indeed, there are many 
instances in which a general influence is of no use whatsoever. The Maldives (both the 
people and government) may view global climate change as a severe injustice that is 
treading on the rights of their nation, and no amount of appreciation of American film 
could possibly change this. Nye capitulates by saying that soft power is context based, 
but this misses an important aspect of why this is the case. This is not an issue of one 
country being “mean” to another, but rather differing understandings of what constitutes 
property rights. The United States has a long tradition and understanding of property 
rights in a very individualistic setting with it remaining appropriate and acceptable for 
corporations to use the commons – such as the air or sea – without any necessary 
payments. In this case, the United State’s approach to what is acceptable rests on 
legitimacy from tradition. Change must therefore come from the problem-solving 
impetus of functional legitimacy or charismatic legitimacy. There is an individual 
understanding of appropriate relations which separates the Maldives from the United 
States – not any general feeling of amiability. This means that culture is only as powerful 
as its ability to influence legitimacy. As Nye recognized, a successful military and 
economy are symbols of prestige and grant the owner a form of legitimacy – coming 
from functional legitimacy. So a nation which has these material things will have claim to 
better business practices that others should mimic. Others don’t see the business practices 
and then conclude that the US should be copied, rather, they look at the results and 
attempt to follow the causes of that success. 
Soft power is a useful tool for understanding how identity changes. However, we 
must move beyond Nye’s account and apply the concept in a more rigorous way with the 
                                               
31 Page 16 in Soft Power by Joseph Nye. 
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full knowledge that the ultimate source of soft power is legitimacy: the belief that 
something ought to be. The agents which help to constitute the state are necessarily 
endowed with legitimacy as the means to creating the state. This legitimacy can be 
applied towards other entities – other actors, states, or the international community, and it 
can take the form of appeals to tradition, charisma, or efficient function. The same can be 
said of the state and its ability to promote a certain view of what should be, trying to 
convince other states, actors, and the international community to go along with it. Lastly, 
the international community can use the same legitimacy that it can bestow upon states to 
help alter what those states believe should be. 
Individuals are the source of all agency, and therefore they have a direct ability to 
change the structure of legitimacy. Even in dictatorships, the regime does not govern 
solely based on their physical power to dominate, but rather has some degree of 
legitimacy as well. Because the regime must work to maintain this legitimacy, a change 
in domestic society’s perception of justice will force the state to change its vision of the 
good or crackdown using limited material resources. Sometimes both a change in state 
identity and a crackdown occur simultaneously. In the United States’ Civil Rights 
Movement, existing regulations were upheld with an oftentimes brutal use of force even 
as these laws were being amended to fit the changing notion of justice. Within the Civil 
Rights Movement there were many overlapping communities and individuals leading the 
cause. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. is perhaps the most famous of these. His actions made 
other individuals and groups (especially religious communities) believe in and support 
the cause. King became a legitimate authority and used his soft power to argue for change 
within the nation. 
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Another form of non-national association which can be endowed with legitimacy 
is the transnational community. Religious groups, scientific communities, and other 
imagined communities which cross national borders can use soft power. In Communist 
Poland, the Catholic Church operated as an “alternative to an unpopular regime.”32 When 
Pope John Paul II traveled to Poland in 1979 huge crowds greeted him at every turn. His 
messages would influence the Polish trade union, Solidarity, which would turn into one 
of the main political oppositions to the Communist regime soon after its founding in 
1980. Lech Wałęsa, the main leader of the trade union and a devout Catholic, accepted 
this close association and found encouragement in the Pope’s words. Indeed, “the very 
existence of a Polish Pope” had “profoundly changed the emotional atmosphere in 
Poland.”33 
States can also use soft power. At the close of the Second World War the United 
States was seen by many to be a state worthy of emulation, especially with regards to 
trade policy. The US was the dominant economic power; it must know the secrets to 
progress!
34
 This legitimacy to construct trade policy permitted the development of the 
Bretton Woods Institutions, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. 
Not everyone was happy with the changes, but the US had the legitimacy to argue that 
this was the way the international economic order should be structured. According to 
Gideon Rachman at the Financial Times, “one senior official at the Bank of England 
described the deal reached at Bretton Woods as "the greatest blow to Britain next to the 
war", largely because it underlined the way in which financial power had moved from the 
                                               
32 Desmond O’Grady, writing for The Sydney Morning Herald on Wednesday October 18th, 1978. 
33 Gwynne Dyver, writing for The Montreal Gazette on Thursday, May 31st, 1979. 
34 The operation of functional legitimacy is clearly in play here. 
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UK to the US.”35 It wasn’t that the US had the ability to buy out England’s system, but 
that the US was seen as having a justified vision of the good for shaping international 
financial institutions.  
The international community can also be a source of soft power. Just as the 
international community can bestow legitimacy upon states, it can use its position of 
authority to encourage orthodoxy from states and individuals. The Secretary-General of 
the United Nations, pronouncements by the General Assembly, statements by regional 
bodies, and even similar press releases by many nations at the same time all serve to 
show the will of the international community. Insofar as individuals and states think that 
these groups are legitimate, then the normative beliefs of the international community 
will excerpt the pull of soft power.  This effect is seen all of the time; when the UN 
General Assembly passes a resolution, even countries which were vehemently opposed to 
it do not generally reject the resolution’s policies as illegitimate. 
 
 
II. Change in Physical Domination 
 
 
 
In addition to changes in desires and perceptions of legitimacy, transformations 
can also take place in the allocation of physical domination. The three levels of individual 
agents and their communities, states, and the international community again come into 
play. Each of these can lose or gain influence based on changes to the distribution of 
physical capabilities. These capabilities can be as diverse as monetary resources, 
                                               
35 Gideon, Rachman. "The Bretton Woods Sequel will Flop."Financial Times, November 11, 2009. 
- 50 - 
 
weapons of war, strategic advantages over others, or even the possible future production 
of such resources. 
A rise in the physical power of the people would be analogous to a relative 
decline in the physical power of the state. In a state which lacks legitimacy, this would 
force the government to acquiesce to some of the demands on the people. The more 
material capabilities that the people control the more their vision of the good will be 
expressed by the state. This effect would be even more direct in states whose legitimacy 
was based on accurately expressing the vision of the good of the people, as in 
democracies. However, if the views of the people were more dissimilar to the 
international community than the government’s old views, this could result in some sort 
of conflict. The state would be perceived internationally as moving towards a rogue 
status, and the government would have no choice in the matter, as going against a 
strengthened people could result in their internal downfall. Depending on the ability of 
the state to defend itself, this could results in its ostracization from the international 
community or even a conflict should the perceived injustices created by the differences in 
visions of the good be sufficiently large. 
A relative decrease in the material power of the people would decrease their 
influence on the state’s vision of the good. If the state lacked domestic legitimacy, this 
would give the regime in power a much stronger control over the vision of the good. If 
the state had domestic legitimacy, then there should not be a change in which vision of 
the good is expressed. For example, the US military grew relatively stronger following 
World War II in comparison with the domestic population, yet the vision of the good that 
was expressed did not change as the state was already legitimate. 
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Changes in material power at the level of the state result in different amounts of 
influence on the international order. Holding legitimacy constant, an increase in state 
power will give it more opportunity to force compliance with its vision of the good. As 
the Soviet Union collapsed, so did its military-industrial complex and its economy. This 
decline reduced the amount of physical force that Russia, the successor state, was able to 
project – regardless of changes in the state’s vision of the good. 
If the ability of the international community to force compliance with the 
orthodox vision of the good declines sufficiently, then the international community risks 
being torn into pieces. Given a static level of legitimacy, a lack of the ability to project 
force risks allowing the presence of rogue states. If that revisionist state were sufficiently 
powerful, there could be multiple international communities competing for influence. 
Indeed, this system most accurately describes the Cold War. Each community or “block” 
of countries operated as the international community, helping to define the participating 
states. Just as a lack of legitimacy in the state and a lack of physical domination to keep it 
together results in the splitting of the state into its lowest common denominators of 
legitimacy and material coercion, the international system can be split into competing 
communities in the presence of insufficient force and legitimacy. 
 When individuals, society, the state, and the international community compete 
over which vision of the good is expressed, two factors determine the outcome. 
Legitimacy influences the content of the system of justice while physical domination 
controls who gets the chance to participate in the negotiations. Legitimacy is the basis for 
attraction which underlies the idea of soft power. Shaping others’ identity through 
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making them want what you want is one of the mechanisms of change, while 
transformations in the distribution of physical capacity is the second. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
“I look forward to a future in which our country will match its military 
strength with our moral restraint, its wealth with our wisdom, its power 
with our purpose. . . . And I look forward to an America which commands 
respect throughout the world not only for its strength but for its 
civilization as well.” 
– President John F. Kennedy36 
 
 International politics is the struggle for justice in pursuit of differing visions of the 
good. Each state has a unique understanding of just conduct and what ought to be to 
which they try and mold the international social order. The vision of the good that the 
state ultimately encourages is determined by individuals’ and the international 
community’s perceptions of legitimacy and the balance of material forces. Change to the 
international order can come from changing identities or physical capabilities at the level 
of the individual or society, the state, or the international community. 
 Our perceptions of what is just and unjust, of what ought to be and ought not to 
be, and of what is legitimate and illegitimate have a profound impact on the world. Much 
theorizing in international relations fails to acknowledge the power of these normative 
thoughts and is all the weaker for it. The concept of soft power as coined by Joseph Nye 
is a useful tool in understanding changes in preferences. However, by recognizing that 
soft power extends beyond simply affinity to the common perceptions of what is 
legitimate, we may better understand and interpret how and when it is possible to “make 
them want what you want.” 
 The usual definition of the state as having “a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force” is too simplistic and, when implemented, is often self-contradictory. The term 
                                               
36 Kennedy, John F. "Remarks at Amherst College." October 26, 1963. May 11, 2012. 
http://www.arts.gov/about/Kennedy.html. 
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“legitimate” implies that there is some common agreement that the state ought to exist, 
yet some political scientists like Alexander Wendt assume that force is always and 
everywhere sufficient to create that legitimacy. It is not. Headway into a more powerful 
social theory of the international system must recognize the state as the social entity that 
it is. 
 The ontology that is constructed in this thesis does not reject the influence of 
material power. Even the claim that states rationally pursue their given ends is maintained 
from more materialist theories. The physical allocation of resources is a critical limitation 
on action and its importance must be recognized and accepted by social theories of the 
international system. Without some acknowledgement of material limitations placed upon 
societies, it is impossible to truly describe the world in which humans operate. Purely 
materialist theories cannot work in isolation, either. Without social reasoning, it becomes 
impossible to soundly draw any claims of how the world should be. 
 Nicolas Sarkozy, the President of France, has declared that the nation will not 
apologize for any atrocities committed in the French occupation of Algeria. “I'm for a 
recognition of the facts, but not for repentance, which is a religious notion that has no 
place in relations between states.”37 Sarkozy is not alone in rejecting the role of moral 
reasoning in international politics. However, by refusing to talk about how states should 
interact, it becomes impossible for the visions of the good of France and Algeria to be 
resolved in mutual understanding. If past actions cannot be publicly recognized as wrong, 
then there can be no way to prevent them from happening again.  
 President Clinton recognized that he was wrong not to support an intervention in 
Rwanda during the genocide. He flew to the Rwandan capital of Kigali and apologized 
                                               
37 As quoted by Karl E. Meyer in the Foreign Policy article “The Politics of Sorry” on March 12, 2012. 
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for the inaction of the international community. In simply recognizing that a past action 
was wrong, he strengthened the claim that genocide is unacceptable in the modern world. 
It is impossible to recognize the good intentions of the responsibility to protect doctrine 
without acknowledging that past failures to uphold this vision of the good were improper. 
 As different ideals of the international order come into conflict, it becomes ever 
more important to understand the origins of each nation’s vision of the good. Each state 
believes that it is doing justice in the world; other’s views cannot simply be dismissed as 
the work of self-interested and evil actors. To make such assumptions risks demonizing 
the other and compromising their rights by treating them without respect – as less than 
human or as less than a state. If the other is evil then we assume that they do not deserve 
to be treated with the rights due to all, even within our own definition of justice and 
order! By recognizing that there are multiple visions of the good we enable ourselves to 
acknowledge their presence and reason through our differences in peace instead of in 
war. International politics is the struggle for justice in pursuit of differing visions of the 
good and we must not be afraid to discuss what the proper international order should be. 
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